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Abstract
Monique Roelofs argues that some of the aesthetic power of
art is traceable to the way that works address their audiences,
promising the creation of cultural community. Such
communities become exclusionary when modes of address
presume and perpetuate social hierarchies. This paper
explores this notion in works where moral and aesthetic
precepts seem to conflict and whose address induces attitudes
that one would reject in “reality” but that are required for the
full appreciative grasp of a narrative.
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1. Introduction

Publisher

In The Cultural Promise of the Aesthetic, Monique Roelofs
undertakes an ambitious project that knits together aesthetics
and politics, with both broadly conceived. The scope of her
claims is enormous, for the aesthetic, as she construes it,
operates with everyday objects as well as artworks, with
conversations as well as poetry. Also, politics is understood to
include relationships among people involving power and its
absence, cultural authority, and mainstream versus
marginalized identities. Roelofs maintains that the aesthetic
features of objects are not only admired but they also possess
considerable social power, even though the influence of the
aesthetic can operate so subtly that it goes unnoticed, making
it all the more important to examine. There are three central
concepts that she introduces to propel her analysis: address,
relationality, and promise. Briefly, this is the way that I
understand the connections among these concepts, though
they are far-reaching and this summary by no means exhausts
their meaning.
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2. Address, relationality, and promise
‘Address’ refers to the ways that artifacts speak to us (as it
were), presuming, sustaining, and sometimes creating cultural
fluency through which we tacitly occupy a particular position in
a community of reception. Address may be easily recognized
in the apostrophic language of a poet or harder to notice in the
mute positioning that a material object induces. As Roelofs
describes it elsewhere, “Address concerns the modes of
signification that we direct at people, things, and places, and
that they direct at us.”[1] When art and other artifacts
address us, we may shift our imaginative positions in the act
of interpreting and understanding their meaning. This
understanding may prompt critical resistance or it may not.
Perhaps most disturbingly, it may not when it should.

Address, which Roelofs calls the “muscles and joints of
aesthetic relationality,” involves several aspects of social
power.[2] First of all, it concerns the scope of audience that
artworks assume as their ideal recipients, for the aesthetic
engenders a web of “relationships” among artists, audiences,
people in positions of cultural authority, and —outside the
circle— people who are culturally disenfranchised. Aesthetic
engagement is a kind of receptive glue that forms cultural
communities. Those communities might be transient, focused
on one work alone, or they might stabilize into general norms
of taste.
The “promise” of the aesthetic includes the communal
harmony of cultural inclusion sustained by aesthetic means, a
harmony that can be warranted or manipulative, hopeful of
change or supportive of the status quo. Address can emerge
from an individual authorial voice but, at the same time,
artists stand within traditions of creativity and absorb
conventions of address that they then pass along in their
works. Thus, modes of address are only partially the effect of
the conscious intentions of artists. The promise of the
aesthetic can be fulfilled but it can also be compromised and
betrayed when the culture on offer is exclusionary. Therefore,
aesthetic modes can also provoke resistance and shifts of what
we might call “taste” but that can also be regarded as a
network of desires and needs that prompt demands for
political change.
While most of the cases Roelofs analyzes are works of art
where, indeed, address is most in evidence, she is by no
means offering a theory that pertains only to art. The
aesthetic pervades life, and so this book is as much a
contribution to the study of the aesthetics of the everyday as
it is of poetry or painting. Even foods speak to us, daring us
to eat something strange or coddling us with the familiar.
Objects such as desks and rooms address their users, making
them feel comfortable or awkward, included in the world they
inhabit or upstarts who don’t belong there. Lack of inclusion
can be amusing, as when parents visiting elementary schools
perch on a child-sized chair. But, more importantly, it can be
coercive, as when an artful product entices us to accept
characterizations in its fictional world that would be offensive
upon reflection.
The triad of concepts Roelofs introduces is examined in
particular detail through what she calls “racialized
aestheticization” when social hierarchies of race are presented
as aesthetic norms, and “aesthetic racialization” when
admiration is bestowed on art that perpetuates racial power
dynamics.[3] Her treatment provides us with a fresh and
powerful way to approach questions about the intersection of
aesthetic and moral values, for often the aesthetic carries a
moral, social, or political valence. By drawing our attention to
the address of different works, Roelofs highlights social values
assumed by art, artists, and audiences, values that are often
so subtle and taken for granted that their power is overlooked,
though exerted nonetheless.
3. When does address interrupt appreciation?
Address most obviously concerns the voices that speak within
narratives. To whom are they speaking? From what

perspective? Who is ignored or omitted from the implied
conversation? Often when one is appreciatively struck by an
artwork, one says “This speaks to me.” But we rarely mean
that it speaks to ME specifically; rather, we mean we are
moved, pleased, or intrigued, sometimes because it opens a
world that is NOT MINE and where I do not belong.
The appreciation of a poem or a painting is seldom a function
of one’s actual social position. Artworks often address their
audiences in ways that demand an imaginative change of
identity. Indeed, that is part of their charm. So, if aesthetic
enjoyment can mark the fact that one’s imagination is
captured by a fictional world, the question becomes, when
does this phenomenon mask or overcome values that would
otherwise be in place?
On occasion, the address of a story interrupts our imaginative
engagement with a fictional world. Sometimes these moments
are jarring but momentary as, for me, is a scene in Casablanca
(1942), when Ilsa Lund (Ingrid Bergman) refers to the pianist
Sam (Dooley Wilson) as “boy.” The dominant address of this
movie, to freedom fighters, anti-fascists, and ordinary people
trying to flee the dangers of war, is the one that takes over,
though once one notices the word, aspects of Sam’s relation
to the other characters become appreciably asymmetrical.
Other times, obnoxious presumptions about audience so
pervade a work that it cannot be appreciated at all. An
example of this for me is the movie Mash (1970), where crass
sexism and supposedly comic racism get in the way of what is
meant to be funny. With such an extreme dissonance between
artistic attempt and moral reception, the aesthetic simply loses
its power. But what of the times when a work is sufficiently
strong that our imaginations carry on without pause? As
Roelofs aptly says, “The realm of the aesthetic furnishes
prolific devices enabling us to adjust aesthetic idioms that we
(not typically consciously) deploy to conceptualize and inhabit
instances of knowledge and ignorance.”[4] In other words,
the aesthetic can covertly and efficiently screen out things we
would prefer not to acknowledge, a tacit “aesthetics of
ignorance” that rides alongside an “epistemology of ignorance”
that induces one willfully to ignore things that one ought to
pay attention to.
4. Reality vs. fiction
We always fill in fictional worlds with familiar realities we
assume in both fiction and real life. This is what Kendall
Walton refers to as the Reality Principle.[5] We don’t need to
be told that Hamlet had great-grandparents, for instance,
because we know that everyone has great-grandparents. We
draw upon ordinary beliefs to supply relevant presumptions
implicit in a story. But when those beliefs include our values,
and the story noticeably violates those values, the Reality
Principle clashes with the fictional world.[6] Walton seems to
trust that in egregious examples, Reality overtakes Fiction and
we cease to enjoy; the promise of the aesthetic is broken
alongside the loss of appreciation. Certainly this can happen
but there are many cases where it does not and where we
remain carried away in the fictional world. In these cases, the
address of the story still holds us in thrall. Though this may
compromise our moral sensibilities, it is also the case that

suspending our Reality Principle seems a necessity if we are to
engage with complex works from different times and cultures.
Does resisting the address of a story restrict our ability to
understand cultures that are not our own? And, if so, is this a
flaw in the story or in our appreciative compass? I think that
the answer to this question is slippery and highly dependent
on the historical imagination that is called upon when we read
things from the past.
5. Two examples of aesthetic pleasures
Among my own reading matter during the weeks after I
finished The Cultural Promise of the Aesthetic were two novels
that summon worlds that are now part of history: Randall
Jarrell’s Pictures from an Institution and Sir Walter Scott’s
historical romance, Quentin Durward. With Roelofs’s book in
mind, I became especially alert to aspects of address as I
read. Both narratives address the reader in terms and tones
that presume, insinuate, and promote attitudes that are now
repugnant towards women and towards non-white peoples.
Both address their readers as white Europeans or EuroAmericans. Both manifest aesthetic racialization. But I
enjoyed them both, and it this appreciation that I now want to
query.
Poet Randall Jarrell’s only novel, Pictures from an Institution,
was written in 1952.[7] It is subtitled “A Comedy.” The
institution in question is a small liberal arts women’s college,
possibly modeled on Sarah Lawrence, where Jarrell taught for
a while. The narrator is a professor; the other characters
include administrators, secretaries, and a writer-in-residence.
The address is familiarly academic in some ways, though the
picture of women in the academy is noticeably of an older era.
An over-worked secretary and an administrative assistant are
women utterly devoted to their bosses, and they are treated
with kind condescension. A professor of literature, Miss
Batterson, is a naïve and virginal soul (who for some reason
drops dead when she moves to another college), and is
regarded as too good for this world in a way that no one today
would recognize in their female colleagues—or indeed in any
woman at all.
Miss Batterson was potentially anything and
actually almost nothing. She was still, after so
many years, taking her first look at life; that first
look was her vocation. She had made tremblingon-the-verge-of-things a steady state, a
permanent one; she lived in the State of
Innocence.[8]
Though I was a bit offended on Miss Batterson’s behalf, I
thought: Oh well, it was the fifties. False consciousness on
my part, perhaps, but I went along with this “picture from an
institution” partly because I wanted to finish the story, and
partly because it was recognizable enough as a snapshot of a
world only recently passed. As such, it was not without
insight and sympathy.
On the other hand, although Jarrell makes some statements
that indicate he was aware of and critical of racial
discrimination in the America of the fifties, his occasional
allusions to Africans as though they simply provide images to

use in comic metaphors are both jarring and, more or less,
gratuitous. It appears that an otherwise sensitive poetic voice
slides into a then-conventional mode of address that became
more obnoxious to a general readership only years after the
book appeared.
Scott’s Quentin Durward (1823) is a novel with a far larger
readership than Jarrell’s. Scott has exerted considerable
aesthetic influence over readers across the globe, and many of
his works have been made into movies for both large screen
and television. Thus, we can presume that the address of his
works continues to possess some power. This particular novel
induces chivalric attitudes towards women—a well-known and
rather seductive convention—and towards kings and dukes to
whom one owes fealty, which is somewhat harder to imagine
but easy enough to go along with as one reads. It also invites
the reader into a world of medieval Christian sensibility that
holds non-Christians in contempt, a particularly important
mode of address that shapes our reception of the gypsies in
the narrative.[9]
The novel takes place in the fifteenth century during a conflict
between the French King Louis XI and Charles the Bold, Duke
of Burgundy. Quentin is a young knight who joins the ranks of
the Scottish Archers who protect the king. He is assigned to
escort to safety Isabelle, Countess of Croye, who is fleeing an
impending forced marriage. Naturally, they fall in love, though
this is hardly the centerpiece of the plot. Acting as a guide is a
gypsy, Hayraddin Maugrabin, who at the secret behest of King
Louis connives to deliver Isabelle into the hands of an even
worse husband, the bestial William de la Marck, the “Wild Boar
of Ardennes.” Although he is a scoundrel and utterly
untrustworthy, Hayraddin is loyal to Quentin for having tried
to save his brother from the gallows. The reader is invited to
consider gypsies as alien, indeed, as hardly human. They are
small and dark, nearly African in complexion, and, in distress,
are prone to strange, Oriental wails. The Europeans—Scottish,
French, Burgundian—hardly know how to classify them, calling
them by just about every outsider name they can think of:
Evil?—why, boy, they are heathens, or Jews, or
Mahommedans at the least, and neither worship
Our Lady nor the Saints … and steal what they
can lay hands on, and sing, and tell fortunes.[10]
When we first meet Hayraddin he is wearing unclean, gaudy
garments; his face is described as a “swarthy and sunburnt
visage” with “black elf-locks which hung around his face, and
the air of wildness and emaciation, which rather seemed to
indicate a savage than a civilized man.”[11] Quentin quizzes
him about his way of life and learns that he owns no property,
observes no laws, has no leader to whom he swears fealty,
and, worst of all, no religion. What does he have? Liberty, he
declares. Liberty of thought, which he claims Quentin lacks
with his entanglement in law, social hierarchies, and religious
beliefs. But this is by no means an appeal to modern readers
with a portrait of savage or secular nobility. The novel does
not treat us to a revelation of Hayraddin’s hidden good
character and an affirmation of the brotherhood of man. He is
a thief and a cheat. His loyalty to Quentin represents a kind
of primitive blood bond, not a thoughtful moral precept.

Hayraddin himself compares his people to dogs, for when they
tell fortunes they are like the hound on the trail of a scent that
mere humans cannot detect. In short, this is not a character
we are supposed to identify with, admire, or like. Scott
musters just about every racist and Euro-centric description
available to his pen to convince us of this.
At the same time, with this character Scott delivers an
extraordinary final scene. Hayraddin, facing execution, asks
Quentin to take care of his horse, apparently his one object of
affection. Refusing a priest and a last-minute conversion that
would save his soul, he asserts that his hope for the afterlife is
only to “be resolved into the elements,” to return to earth so
that
the mysterious frame of humanity shall melt into
the general mass of nature, to be recompounded
in the other forms with which she daily supplies
those which daily disappear, and return under
different forms—the watery particles to streams
and showers, the earthly parts to enrich their
mother earth, the airy portions to wanton in the
breeze, and those of fire to supply the blaze of
Aldeboran…. Hence! begone!—disturb me no
farther![12]
He then greets the gallows “as one who, plunged in reverie,
bids adieu to company which distracts his thoughts.”[13]
In the atmosphere of the story, these words are blasphemous
and bereft of soul. But they are among the most memorable
in the whole long novel, and I read them over and over. The
consternating point is that without the reader’s participation in
the unrelievedly denigrating portrait of gypsies, the drama of
this execution would falter. Hayraddin must remain steadfastly
Other for the dramatic content of his fearsome sensibilities to
sustain their power. In other words, an aesthetic triumph of
this narrative rides on the reader’s imaginative acceptance of
deeply disturbing ethical precepts.
6. Concluding reflections
My point with these examples is to highlight the complexities
of address when we assess its power over the moral
imagination, especially when art takes us into the past. When
a reader enters appreciatively into the world of these novels,
does a kind of moral compromise sneak into the experience?
With a novel from the 1950s, such as Pictures from an
Institution, the repugnant sensibilities it assumes are still
relatively recent and raw; perhaps they stand out for that
reason (rather like the hair styles in movies of the early 1960s
that look outdated, whereas those of the 1930s and 40s are
elegant and period-appropriate). We might think of Quentin
Durward as just a vivid portrait of a time so long gone that it
has no practical thrall over anyone today, though I doubt this
is the case. The conventions of historical romance continue to
exert considerable audience appeal, whether in prose novels,
movies, or video games, where medieval costuming and
weaponry are rife. Such works evidently still grab the
imagination of many, and they represent a lucrative aesthetic
industry.

So my own confession of engagement with these books is also
designed to prompt a worry. As Roelofs so deftly argues, such
works exert a covert power over our minds. And it is certainly
enticing to abandon one’s Reality Principles from time to time.
Perhaps this should lead us to wonder how to identify those
moments when our aesthetic engagement prompts an
irresistible but reprehensible enjoyment. Yet, at the same
time, without the capacity to respond appreciatively to
appealing and repugnant attitudes alike, our aesthetic
sensibility and our moral compass might become narrower and
less flexible to changing culture. Such may be the abiding
tension between aesthetic and moral values.
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